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Comment 
THE NEEDLE LIVES TO SEE ANOTHER DAY!  
THREE-DRUG PROTOCOL RULED 
CONSTITUTIONAL IN GLOSSIP V. GROSS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment provides one of the most important 
protections for citizens—prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.1  
Since the founding of the United States, the death penalty has been left to 
the states to implement, so long as it does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.2  As a result, states have ratified their criminal codes and 
constitutions to keep their method of capital punishment within the 
constitutional limits.3  Challenges to states’ methods of execution began as 
early as the mid-1800s.4  In one such case from 2015, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Glossip v. Gross to determine if the three-drug protocol 
used to carry out lethal injection as the primary form of execution violated 
the Eighth Amendment.5  The majority of states that still have capital 
punishment use lethal injection as their primary form of execution.6  
Joining the large number of cases recognizing that a three-drug protocol 
is constitutional, the Court upheld Oklahoma’s death penalty.7 
In analyzing the Court’s decision in Glossip, this Comment will 
grapple with whether lethal injection is appropriate under the United 
                                                
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the government from inflicting cruel or 
unusual punishment against its people). 
2 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (providing that while the State has the power 
to punish, the amendment stands to assure this power is exercised within the limits of 
civilized standards). 
3 See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXII, § 22 (amended 1933) (stating individuals who committed 
offenses before the effective date of the amendment shall have the choice of either lethal 
injection or lethal gas). 
4 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (holding execution by shooting does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment). 
5 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2729 (2015) (granting certiorari to address plaintiffs’ 
claim that Oklahoma’s death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment). 
6 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42 (2008) (citing that lethal injection is the most common 
method of implementing the death penalty).  At the time of the Baze decision, thirty-six states 
had adopted lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of implementing the death 
penalty, which made it the most used form of execution.  Id.  Of the thirty-six states that 
adopted lethal injection, thirty used the same combination of three drugs in their lethal 
injection protocol.  Id. at 44. 
7 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (finding that the three-drug protocol used in Oklahoma 
for executions did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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States Constitution.8  Part II discusses the facts from Glossip v. Gross.9  Next, 
Part III reviews the legal background of the protections provided under 
the Eighth Amendment and how the death penalty has stayed within the 
realm of the Eighth Amendment.10  Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Glossip, arguing that the Court correctly applied standards for 
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment established by judicial 
precedent, and discusses any future consequences of its application to 
future death penalty cases.11 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS IN GLOSSIP V. GROSS 
On June 25, 2014, four plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction.12  The plaintiffs’ motion cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging that 
the lethal injection protocol in Oklahoma violated the Constitution.13  On 
December 22, 2014, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for 
preliminary injunction, concluding that plaintiffs did not establish a 
likelihood of success on the merits of counts two or seven.14  The plaintiffs 
                                                
8 See infra Part II–IV (analyzing whether or not the Court correctly reviewed previous 
cases and tests concerning the death penalty). 
9 See infra Part II (stating the facts in Glossip v. Gross). 
10 See infra Part III (reviewing the evolution in the protections of the Eighth Amendment 
and of the Supreme Court’s position on the death penalty). 
11 See infra Part IV (providing a detailed look into why the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Glossip v. Gross was correct). 
12 See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 2015) (listing the plaintiffs, Charles 
Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin Cole, who were among the twenty-one 
Oklahoma death-row inmates who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit). 
13 See id. at 723 (holding that plaintiffs were convicted of first degree murder and 
sentenced to death); see also Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 856 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) 
(detailing that Charles Warner anally raped and murdered his girlfriend’s eleven-month-old 
daughter and was sentenced to death); Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143, 147 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2007) (explaining Richard Glossip hired another motel employee to kill the owner of the 
motel and was sentenced to death for first degree murder); Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 789 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (articulating John Grant murdered a food service supervisor by 
repeatedly stabbing her with a prison-made shank; he was sentenced to death for first degree 
murder); Cole v. State, 164 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (depicting Benjamin Cole 
murdered his nine-month-old daughter by pushing her legs toward her head as she lay on 
her stomach crying , which resulted in him being sentenced to death for first degree murder); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“[A]ny citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be held liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . .”). 
14 See Warner, 776 F.3d at 726–27 (determining the district court ruled from the bench and 
denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction).  Count two alleged that the inherent 
characteristics of midazolam—including an alleged ceiling effect and an alleged risk of 
paradoxical reactions—render it unsuitable as a stand-alone anesthetic, and thus, pose a 
substantial risk that an inmate would experience “severe pain, needless suffering, and a 
lingering death.”  Id.  Count seven alleged that the defendants were engaging in a program 
of biological experimentation on captive and unwilling human subjects.  Id. 
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filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 2014, along with an emergency 
motion for stay of execution.15 
On appeal, following the denied motion for a preliminary injunction, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.16  In 
addition to affirming the district court’s decision, the Court of Appeals 
added that failing to identify an alternative form of execution was not 
outcome-determinative in this case.17  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, then stayed the executions of the petitioners pending the 
resolution of this case.18 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF GLOSSIP V. GROSS 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 
the federal government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or 
cruel and unusual punishment.19  There has been an evolution within the 
courts in regard to the rights under the Eighth Amendment and how 
various forms of execution have been accepted.20  The interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment evolved to meet society at the time death penalty 
cases were decided.21  However, the Eighth Amendment has been 
interpreted differently over time.22 
                                                
15 See id. at 727 (stating that, along with filing a notice of appeal, plaintiffs filed an 
emergency motion for stay of execution pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 8 
and 27). 
16 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (confirming the district court’s finding 
of fact).  The Tenth Circuit affirmed and accepted the district court’s finding of fact regarding 
midazolam’s efficacy.  Id. 
17 See id. at 2736 (holding the ruling was “not outcome-determinative”).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that because the plaintiffs failed to show that 
midazolam, either in its inherent characteristics or its possible negligent administration, 
created a demonstrated risk of severe pain, it was not necessary to reach the alternative-form 
test.  Id. 
18 See id. (showing that the Court voted to grant review and stay the executions of Glossip, 
Cole, and Grant).  Glossip, Cole, and Grant’s executions were stayed pending the Supreme 
Court’s ruling.  Id.  However, Warner was executed on January 15, 2015.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2736. 
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (explaining there shall be no excessive bail, fines, or cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
20 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating the Eighth Amendment has not 
been regarded as a static concept).  The Court discussed how the Eighth Amendment must 
draw its meaning.  Id. 
21 See id. at 173 (determining that an assessment of contemporary values concerning the 
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment).  
The Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency, 
which mark the progress of a maturing society.  Id.  Additionally, the punishment for the 
crime must be proportional.  Id. 
22 See id. at 154 (explaining how the death penalty should be analyzed in the various levels 
of courts).  The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner.  
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It was not until the mid-1800s that the death penalty was challenged 
under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the Eighth 
Amendment, and the beginning of a different interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment began.23  After the ruling in Wilkerson v. State of Utah, the 
Supreme Court saw a number of cases that would establish the commonly 
practiced forms of the death penalty.24  In 1890, New York moved to make 
electrocution its primary form of execution.25  The Supreme Court rejected 
the petitioners’ argument that because the new form of punishment was 
unusual, it violated the Eighth Amendment.26 
Further, in Nevada in 1921, lethal gas was a new form of 
punishment.27  After the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
lethal gas was a cruel or unusual punishment, other states adopted it to 
carry out their death penalty punishments.28  Along with lethal injection 
and lethal gas, some states used hanging and a firing squad as forms of 
execution.29  There was a period of nine years that saw a pause in 
                                                
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154.  The Court recognized that in order for “a principle to be vital, [it] 
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”  Id. 
23 See Wilkerson v. State of Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (discussing the various modes of 
execution that have been used in the past and applying the Eighth Amendment to those 
methods).  Shooting, as a mode of executing the death penalty for a death row inmate, did 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  Id. 
24 See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890) (using different cases to discuss the 
relationship between state laws and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).  Death by 
electrocution was found not to violate the Eighth Amendment, so it was adopted by a 
majority of states.  Id. 
25 See id. at 445 (citing New York Code of Criminal Procedure § 505 (1888), which states 
“the punishment of death must in every case be inflicted by causing to pass through the body 
of a convict a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death, and the application 
of such current must be continued until such convict is dead”). 
26 See id. at 448 (holding the enactment of the statute was within the power of the state 
legislature).  Although the new method of execution might be said to be unusual because it 
was new, “it could not be assumed to be cruel in the light of that common knowledge which 
has stamped certain punishments as such; that it was for the legislature to say in what 
manner sentence of death should be executed; [and] that this act was passed in the effort to 
devise a more humane method of reaching the result.”  Id. 
27 See State v. Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nv. 1923) (providing the Nevada legislature was seeking 
to provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in the most humane way).  In Jon, the 
court held that it was a scientific fact that lethal gas provided a painless death.  Id.  It was 
also said that while suffering and torture may be inflicted by the administration of lethal gas, 
it was not a sufficient argument against lethal gas.  Id.  The court must presume that the 
officials administering the lethal gas will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.  Id.  The 
state statute that authorized the execution of persons convicted of murder in the first degree 
by the use of lethal gas did not violate the federal or state constitution.  Id. 
28 See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXII, § 22 (amended 1933) (stating the judgment of death shall be 
“inflicted by administering an intravenous injection of a substance in a lethal quantity”). 
29 See UTAH CODE CRIM. PROC. § 105-37-16 (1933) (allowing prisoners to be executed by 
hanging or firing squad). 
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executions in the United States, however.30  Along with ending the nine-
year pause, Gregg v. Georgia provided that the Eighth Amendment must 
adapt with the changing society, and the punishment must be 
proportional to the crime.31 
Lethal injection is the most commonly used form of carrying out the 
death penalty, and it was not until recently that the Supreme Court 
provided a two-step protocol for lethal injection to be constitutional.32  In 
Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court found that the three-drug protocol used 
in Kentucky to carry out the death penalty did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.33  Additionally, in Baze, it was determined that just because 
an execution method may result in pain, it does not mean it is cruel or 
unusual.34  In 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Glossip to 
determine whether the three-drug protocol used by Oklahoma violated 
the Eighth Amendment.35 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN GLOSSIP V. GROSS 
A. The Glossip v. Gross Decision 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the lethal 
injection protocol used in Oklahoma to carry out the death penalty did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.36  Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel 
                                                
30 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (concluding a jury can no longer wantonly 
and freakishly impose the death sentence).  The nine-year pause on the death penalty ended 
when the Supreme Court held that the new statutory scheme for the death penalty in Georgia 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id. 
31 See id. at 173, 187 (discussing the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency, which mark the progress of a maturing society and that the 
punishment for the crime must be proportional). 
32 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42 (2008) (showing a total of thirty-six states have adopted 
lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of carrying out the death penalty).  If a 
state does not give an alternative procedure, its current method might be found to be cruel 
and unusual.  Id. at 52.  First, a petitioner must effectively address a “substantial risk of 
serious harm.”  Id.  Second, a petitioner must provide an alternative form of execution.  Id.  
The alternative form must be feasible, readily implemented, and significantly reduce a 
substantial risk of severe pain.  Id. 
33 See id. at 63 (reminding everyone that throughout history, whenever a method of 
execution was challenged as cruel and unusual, the Court rejected it).  Kentucky’s three-drug 
protocol is consistent with the Eighth Amendment.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 63. 
34 See id. at 50 (establishing that violation of the Eighth Amendment depends on the 
conditions presenting the risk being “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering”).  Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by accident or 
as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the sort of “objectively intolerable 
risk of harm” that would qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. 
35 See supra Part II (providing the factual background of Glossip v. Gross). 
36 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (providing two independent reasons 
why the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision).  The Court found petitioners failed to 
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Alito began by providing a descriptive background of the evolution of the 
death penalty, including the several methods used to carry out 
punishment, and how they did not violate the Eighth Amendment.37  To 
support his reasoning as to why it was proper to deny petitioners 
injunction, Justice Alito relied in part on the holding in Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.38  Along with the precedent set in Winter, 
Alito also relied on Baze.39 
In a contested decision, the Court affirmed that the three-drug 
protocol used by Oklahoma did not violate the Eighth Amendment.40  The 
Court applied the test set forth in Baze to determine the constitutionality 
of the lethal injection protocol.41  Justice Alito provided that if the 
petitioners in Glossip were able to prove that the Oklahoma protocol 
creates a risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when compared 
to alternative methods, the petitioners would have succeeded in their 
request for an injunction.42 
In his opinion, Justice Alito first affirmed based on petitioners’ failure 
to satisfy the first requirement from the Baze test.43  The Court rejected the 
                                                
identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of 
pain.  Id.  The Court also found that the District Court did not commit clear error when it 
found the petitioners failed to establish that Oklahoma’s use of massive doses of midazolam 
in its execution protocol entails a substantial risk of severe pain.  Id.  Therefore, the three-
drug protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  The specific drug that petitioners 
were concerned about was midazolam, which is supposed to put the inmate in a coma like 
state.  Id. 
37 See id. at 2731–32 (reviewing the different forms of the death penalty and their 
constitutionality in comparison to the Eighth Amendment). 
38 See 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (overturning the lower courts granting of a preliminary 
injunction).  For a plaintiff to succeed seeking a preliminary injunction, he must establish 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in 
the public interest.  Id. 
39 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52 (listing the requirements for a preliminary injunction to succeed). 
40 See Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Day at Court, SLATE (2015), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2015/04/glossip_v_gross_suprem
e_court_justices_argue_about_lethal_injection_abolition.single.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8U7U-YSG8] (highlighting the contention in the courtroom on the day of the decision).  Chief 
Justice John Roberts had to step in and scold his colleagues for their rancor and rudeness 
during oral arguments.  Id. 
41 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52 (providing the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily 
implemented, and significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain). 
42 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (proving specifically that Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when 
compared to the known and available alternatives).  The only way to succeed in a motion for 
a preliminary injunction is if these requirements are met.  Id. 
43 See id. at 2738 (denying petitioners’ argument that the State could use sodium thiopental 
as part of a single drug protocol).  The first ground of affirmance for the Court was based on 
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petitioners’ argument that they need not identify a known and available 
alternative method of execution that presents less risk of harm.44  The 
petitioners additionally argued that the requirement to identify an 
alternative method contravenes the Court’s pre-Baze decision in Hill v. 
McDonough.45  Justice Alito rejected the petitioners’ claim based on the 
ruling in Hill, which established that a method-of-execution claim must be 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because such a claim does not attack the 
validity of the prisoner’s conviction or death sentence.46  Additionally, the 
Court rejected the petitioners’ argument against the use of midazolam for 
their execution; the court articulated that relying on a previous inmate’s 
pain suffered during his execution was not enough to establish that 
midazolam was sure or very likely to cause pain in theirs.47 
In support of the affirmation of the second requirement in Baze, Justice 
Alito provided a four-point analysis.48  First, the Court reviewed the 
district court’s factual findings under the deferential “clear error” test, 
                                                
petitioners’ failure to satisfy their burden on establishing that any risk of harm was 
substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method of execution.  Id. 
44 See id. (concluding the petitioners did not show a risk of pain so great that other 
acceptable, available methods must be used).  Petitioners’ argument goes against Baze, which 
is now the controlling opinion and the requirements that the Court now follows.  Id. 
45 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738 (implying petitioners misread the decision in Hill).  The 
portion of the opinion in Hill on which they relied concerned a question of civil procedure, 
not a substantive Eighth Amendment question.  Id.  See also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 
577 (2006) (explaining the petitioner already brought an unsuccessful federal habeas corpus 
petition).  The question before the Court was whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an 
action for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ, or whether it may 
proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id.  Filing an action that can proceed 
under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of 
course.  Id. at 583. 
46 See id. at 579–80 (stating that habeas corpus and a § 1983 claim are two main avenues to 
relief on complaints related to imprisonment).  Challenges to the validity of any confinement 
or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.  Id.  An inmate’s 
challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983.  
Id. 
47 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2745–46 (claiming that Lockette had only been administered 100 
milligrams of midazolam and the issue with the execution was the inability to find an IV 
site).  Aside from the Lockett execution, twelve other executions were conducted using the 
three-drug protocol at issue here, and those appear to have been conducted without any 
significant problems.  Id. 
48 See id. at 2739 (explaining the four-part test consisted of:  a “clear error” standard, the 
petitioners bearing the burden of persuasion, the court’s conclusions about the use of 
midazolam, and the testing of the authority and competency of federal courts given 
challenges to lethal injection).  The district court did not commit clear error when it found 
that midazolam is highly likely to render a person unable to feel pain during an execution.  
Id.  See also Baze, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (stating that the petitioner must show an alternative form of 
execution). 
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finding that there was no clear error.49  Second, the petitioners bear the 
burden of persuasion on the issue, which they failed to meet.50  Third, 
several courts have concluded that midazolam succeeded in its intended 
purpose.51  Fourth, challenges to lethal injection test the authority and 
competency of federal courts.52  In addition to bearing the burden of 
persuasion on the issue, petitioners also have to show the ceiling effect for 
midazolam was lower than it was intended to be.53 
Finally, Justice Alito discussed the safeguards that Oklahoma has 
taken to administer midazolam.54  Justice Alito pointed to three steps that 
were taken by Oklahoma:  (1) the execution team must secure both a 
primary and backup IV access site; (2) the execution team must confirm 
the viability of the IV sites; and (3) the execution team must continuously 
monitor the offender’s level of consciousness.55  Additionally, the Court 
noted that the safeguards implemented by Oklahoma configure with the 
Court’s conclusion in Baze, along with satisfying the dissent’s argument in 
that case.56 
                                                
49 See id. (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (stating the clear error 
standard does not entitle the Court to overturn a finding simply because the Court is 
convinced that it would have decided the case differently)). 
50 See id. (acknowledging that petitioners expended a great effort attacking peripheral 
aspects of the doctor’s testimony).  Petitioners made little attempt to provide evidence to the 
district court that the use of midazolam is sure or very likely to result in needless suffering.  
Glossip, 153 S. Ct. at 2739. 
51 See id. at 2739–40 (affirming the Court’s decision by explaining that several other trial 
courts have reached the same finding, with multiple appellate courts affirming those 
decisions).  Numerous courts concluded that midazolam, as the first drug, is likely to render 
an inmate insensate to pain that might result from the administration of the paralytic agent 
and potassium chloride.  Id. 
52 See id. at 2740 (reiterating Justice Samuel Alito stating that federal courts should not 
“embroil themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”). 
53 See id. at 2743 (criticizing petitioners argument that midazolam has a “ceiling” above 
which any increase in dosage produces no effect).  It is petitioners’ burden to establish that 
midazolam’s ceiling occurred at a dosage below the massive 500-milligram dose employed 
in the Oklahoma protocol and at a point at which the drug failed to render the recipient 
insensate to pain.  Id. 
54 See Glossip, 153 S. Ct. at 2742.  Oklahoma took important measures to make sure that the 
administration of the midazolam would occur without incident.  Id. 
55 See id. (agreeing with the District Court that Oklahoma took safeguards to minimize the 
risk that might occur during the execution).  The district court did not commit clear error in 
concluding that these safeguards help to minimize any risk that might occur in the event that 
midazolam does not operate as intended.  Id. 
56 See id. (pointing out the difference between the protocols in Kentucky and Oklahoma).  
The Court concluded in Baze that the establishment of a primary and backup IV, and the 
presence of personnel to monitor an inmate, help to significantly reduce the risk that an 
execution protocol will violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  Many of the safeguards that 
Oklahoma implemented coincide with what the dissent pointed out in Baze.  Glossip, 153 S. 
Ct. at 2742. 
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B. Appraisal of the Glossip v. Gross Decision 
The Court in Glossip reached the correct result.57  Oklahoma’s use of 
the three-drug protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution because it satisfies the requirements set forth 
under prior judicial rulings.58  The right of petitioners to seek a 
preliminary injunction was fully recognized by the Court.59  Furthermore, 
states have the right to implement a chosen method to carry out the death 
penalty as long as it does not violate the Constitution.60  Because the Court 
followed judicial precedent set forward in Baze and concluded that the 
petitioners failed to meet those standards, the ruling was correct.61 
C. Potential Consequences of the Glossip Decision 
The constitutionality of the death penalty will continue to be a 
controversial topic, just as it is now.62  Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, in 
which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, provided a passionate 
argument against the majority opinion.63  The dissent thought it was a 
good time to reopen the question of the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.64  Additionally, Justice Breyer provided four reasons as to why 
this question should be reopened, which included:  (1) serious 
unreliability; (2) arbitrariness in application; (3) unconscionably long 
                                                
57 See generally Beaty v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1072 (2011) (holding that to obtain 
preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he is likely to succeed on 
the merits of such a claim; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction 
is in the public interest). 
58 See Glossip, 153 S. Ct. at 2739–40 (providing critical analysis of the standards set forth in 
Baze to the facts of the current case before the Court). 
59 See id. at 2729 (giving the petitioners the opportunity to show that they were likely to 
succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public’s best interest). 
60 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (explaining the phrase “cruel and unusual” is 
policy reflected in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice). 
61 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2729 (articulating the standards in Baze are that a prisoner must 
establish that lethal injection creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the risk is 
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives). 
62 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”)). 
63 See supra Part IV.A (providing an analysis of the decision in Glossip v. Gross). 
64 See Glossip, 153 U.S. at 2755 (asking whether the death penalty violates the Constitution).  
Justice Stephen Breyer points out that when the Court upheld the death penalty nearly forty 
years ago, statutes contained safeguards sufficient to ensure that the penalty would be 
applied reliably and not arbitrarily.  Id.  Since application of the death penalty has changed, 
Justice Breyer believes that the question of the death penalty should be reopened.  Id. 
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delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose; and (4) 
most places in the United States have abandoned its use.65  The holding in 
Glossip will lead to a continuing time of controversy, with no signs of 
improvement.66 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The death penalty has been both a moral and Constitutional issue as 
long as the United States has been around.  As society has evolved and 
matured, so have the opinions on this issue.  The Court confidently 
applied the standards set by judicial precedents to the decision in Glossip 
v. Gross.  Additionally, the Court accepted the precautions that Oklahoma 
took in ensuring the penalty was carried out smoothly and legally.  Based 
on Glossip, states will have a guideline to abide by when carrying out the 
death penalty.  Furthermore, Glossip provides clear standards that a 
plaintiff needs to meet to be successful in a motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Finally, states with the same protocol as Oklahoma will feel 
more secure in administering their penalties without fear of a 
Constitutional challenge. 
Steven Paku 
                                                
65 See id. at 2756 (drawing from Justice Breyer’s four reasons as to why the question on the 
death penalty should be reopened, his time on the bench, and his belief that the death penalty 
is cruel and unusual punishment). 
66 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Use of Execution Drug, N.Y. TIMES (2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-execution-drug.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/SRD9-KL3L] (discussing the ruling in Glossip and highlighting how 
divided the Court is on the death penalty).  Justice Breyer and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
came very close to announcing that they were ready to rule the death penalty 
unconstitutional.  Id.  However, that gave rise to debate with Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Justice Clarence Thomas.  Id.  Justice Scalia called Justice Breyer’s plea for judicial abolition 
of the death penalty “gobbledygook.”  Id.  The exchange between the Justices in this case 
highlights the current controversy and demonstrates that this debate is far from over.  Id. 
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